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Automated analysis of equivalence properties
for security protocols using else branches ?
Ivan Gazeau and Steve Kremer
LORIA, INRIA Nancy - Grand-Est
Abstract. In this paper we present an extension of the AKISS protocol verifi-
cation tool which allows to verify equivalence properties for protocols with else
branches, i.e., disequality tests. While many protocols are represented as linear
sequences or inputs, outputs and equality tests, the reality is often more com-
plex. When verifying equivalence properties one needs to model precisely the
error messages sent out when equality tests fail. While ignoring these branches
may often be safe when studying trace properties this is not the case for equiva-
lence properties, as for instance witnessed by an attack on the European electronic
passport. One appealing feature of our approach is that our extension re-uses the
saturation procedure which is at the heart of the verification procedure of AKISS
as a black box, without need to modify it. As a result we obtain the first tool
that is able verify equivalence properties for protocols that may use xor and else
branches. We demonstrate the tool’s effectiveness on several case studies, includ-
ing the AKA protocol deployed in mobile telephony.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are communication protocols that rely on cryptographic primitives,
e.g. encryption, or digital signatures to ensure security properties, e.g., confidential-
ity or authentication. Well-known examples of security protocols include TLS [23],
Kerberos [28] and IKE [27]. These protocols are extremely difficult to design as they
must ensure the expected security property, even if the network is under control of an
attacker: each message sent on the network can be intercepted by the attacker, each
received message potentially originates from the attacker, and the attacker may manip-
ulate all received data by applying functions on it. Moreover, as several sessions of the
protocol may be executed concurrently, one must consider all possible interleavings,
and the attacker may even participate in some of these sessions as a legitimate partic-
ipant. As a result, a security proof by hand is extremely tricky as it would require to
explore all of the possible cases.
A successful approach to discover weaknesses in such protocols, or show their ab-
sence is to use dedicated formal verification tools. A variety of tools for analysing proto-
cols exist: ProVerif [14], Scyther [21], Maude-NPA [24], Tamarin [31], AVISPA [7], . . .
? The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Coun-
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These tools were generally initially developed for verifying trace properties of rather
simple protocols. In the last years there has been a large body of works for extending
these tools to handle more general properties and more complex protocols.
Most tools were designed for analysing trace properties: a protocol cannot reach a
bad state, e.g., a state where the attacker knows a secret value. Many important security
properties are however stated in terms of indistinguishability: can an attacker distin-
guish two protocols? For instance real-or-random secrecy states the indistinguishability
of two protocols, one outputting at the end of the run the “real” secret, used within the
protocol, while the other protocol outputs a freshly generated random secret. Similarly,
unlinkability can be modeled by the adversary’s inability to distinguish two sessions
run by the same party form two sessions run by two different parties. More generally,
strong flavours of secrecy [12], anonymity and unlinkability [5], as well as vote pri-
vacy [22], are expressed as indistinguishability. This notion is naturally modelled in
formal models through behavioural equivalences in cryptographic process calculi, such
as the spi [3] and applied pi calculus [1]. During the last years, several specific tools
for checking such equivalences have been developed [32,17,15], or existing tools have
been extended to handle these properties [13,10,30].
Similarly, many tools were designed to verify protocols that have a simple, linear ex-
ecution flow: many protocol specification languages allow several roles in parallel, each
consisting of a sequence of input, or output actions with the possibility to check equality
between parts of messages. More complex protocols do however require branching, and
allow to react differently according to whether an equality test holds or not (rather than
just halting if a test fails). As demonstrated by an attack on the European electronic
passport [20], taking into account the exact error message in case a test fails may be
crucial: the fact that in some versions of the passport output different error messages
allowed an attacker to trace a given passport. In this paper we will extend the AKISS
tool with the ability to verify protocols that have else branches.
An overview of the AKISS tool. The AKISS tool [15] is a verification tool for check-
ing indistinguishability properties. More precisely, it verifies trace equivalence in a
replication free (i.e., considering a bounded number of sessions) and positive (no else
branches) fragment of the applied pi calculus. The tool allows a wide range of cryp-
tographic primitives that are specified by the means of a user defined equational the-
ory. The tool is correct for any equational theory that can be oriented into a conver-
gent rewrite system which has the finite variant property and was shown to guarantee
termination on any subterm convergent equational theory. This class of theories in-
clude classical cryptographic primitives such as encryption, signatures and hashes, but
also non-interactive zero knowledge proofs. Moreover, even though termination is not
guaranteed protocols relying on blind signatures or trapdoor commitments have been
successfully analysed. In addition, a recent extension of AKISS provides support for
protocols that use the exclusive or (xor) operation [8].
In a nutshell, AKISS proceeds as follows. Protocols are translated into first-order
Horn clauses. Next, the set of Horn clauses is saturated using a dedicated Horn clause
resolution procedure. This saturated set of clauses provides a finite representation of
all reachable states of the protocols, of the intruder knowledge and equality tests that
hold on the protocol outputs. These equality tests are used by the adversary to distin-
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guish protocols, i.e., its aim is to find a test which holds on one protocol, but not the
other. Next, AKISS uses this saturated set of Horn clauses to decide trace equivalence
when the processes specifying the protocol are determinate (the precise definition of
determinacy will be given in section 2). On general processes, AKISS may over- and
under-approximate trace equivalence, as discussed in [15].
Our contributions. Our main contribution is to extend the AKISS tool to allow more
complex protocols which allow non trivial else branches. An interesting point of our
approach is that we do not need to modify the saturation procedure of AKISS: we only
need to saturate positive processes (in which disequality tests are ignored). The algo-
rithm is based on the following simple observation: whenever a trace is not executable
because of the failure of a disequality test t1 6= t2, the saturation of the process in which
t1 6= t2 is replaced by t1 = t2 computes all the traces that fail to execute on the original
process (due to this particular disequality test). This test can then be confronted to the
other process that we expect to be trace equivalent.
From a theoretical point, given that the saturation of AKISS was shown to terminate
on any subterm convergent rewrite system our algorithm provides, en passant, a new
decidability result for the class of subterm convergent equational theories for protocols
with else branches, generalising the results of [11,19] that do not allow else branches
and the result of [16], which only applies to a particular equational theory. Moreover,
the result is modular, in the sense that if we generalize the saturation procedure to other
equational theories support for else branches comes for “for free”. From a more practi-
cal point, we have implemented our new procedure in the AKISS tool and demonstrate
its effectiveness on several case studies. Hence, we provide the first tool that is able to
handle protocols that require both xor and else braches: in addition to previously anal-
ysed protocols, such as the private authentication protocol and the BAC protocol imple-
mented in the European passport, this allows us to analyse protocols using xor, such as
the AKA protocol [4] used in 3G and 4G mobile telephony, as well as xor-based RFID
protocols with key update (which requires an else branch for the modelling). A previous
analysis of the AKA protocol with ProVerif replaced the use of xor with encryption [6].
Replacing xor by encryption may however miss attacks as it was shown by Ryan and
Schneider in [29].
Related work. We consider two kinds of tools: those restricted to a bounded number
of sessions (as in our work) and those that allow for an unbounded number of sessions.
The first kind of tools includes the SPEC and APTE tools. SPEC [32] allows to verify
a symbolic bisimulation: it only supports a fixed equational theory (encryption, signa-
ture, hash and mac) and has no support for else branches. The APTE tool also supports
a fixed equational theory (similar to SPEC), but allows else branches. Both tools are
not restricted to determinate processes. Tools that allow protocol verification for an un-
bounded number of sessions include ProVerif, Maude NPA and Tamarin. Given that the
underlying problem is undecidable when the number of sessions is not bounded, termi-
nation is not guaranteed. Each of these tools allows for else branches user-defined equa-
tional theories, but ProVerif and Tamarin do not include support for xor. While Maude
NPA does support xor in principle, termination fails even on simple examples [30]. We
may also note that the support for else branches in Maude NPA is very recent [34].
3
Finally, each of these three tools checks a more fine-grained relation that trace or obser-
vational equivalence, called diff-equivalence: this equivalence requires both processes
to follow the same execution flow and is too fine-grained for some applications.
Full proofs, omitted because of lack of space, are available in [25].
2 A formal model for security protocols
In this section we introduce our formal language for modelling security protocols. Mes-
sages are modelled as terms and equipped with an equational theory, that models the
algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives. The protocols themselves will be mod-
elled in a process calculus similar to the applied pi calculus [1]: protocol participants
are modelled as processes and their interaction through message passing.
2.1 Term algebra
Terms are built over the following atomic messages : the set of names N , that is par-
titioned into private names Nprv and public names Npub; the set of message variables
X , denoted x, y, . . .; the set of parameters W = {w1,w2, . . .}. Private names are
used to model fresh, secret values, such as nonces or cryptographic keys. Public names
represent publically known values such as identifier and are available to the attacker.
Parameters allow the adversary to refer to messages that were previously output.
We consider a signature Σ, i.e., a finite set of function symbols together with their
arity. Function symbols of arity 0 are called constants. Given a signature Σ and a set
of atoms A we denote by T (Σ,A) the set of terms, defined as the smallest set that
contains A and is closed under application of function symbols. We denote by vars(t)
the set of variables occurring in a term t. A substitution is a function from variables to
terms, lifted to terms homomorphically. The application of a substitution σ to a term u
is written uσ, and we denote dom(σ) its domain, i.e. dom(σ) = {x | σ(x) 6= x}. We
denote the identity substitution whose domain is the empty set by ∅.
We equip the signature Σ with an equational theory E: an equational theory is
defined by a set of equations M = N with M,N ∈ T (Σ,X ). The equational theory E
induces an equivalence relation =E on terms: =E is the smallest equivalence on terms,
which contains all equations M = N in E, is closed under application of function
symbols and substitutions of variables by terms.
Example 1. As an example we model the exclusive-or operator. LetΣxor = {⊕, 0}, and
the equational theory Exor defined by the following equations:
x⊕ x = 0 x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z x⊕ 0 = x x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
Additional primitives, e.g. pairs, symmetric and asymmetric encryptions, signa-
tures, hashes, etc, can be modelled by extending the signature and equational theory.
Example 2. Let Σ+xor = Σxor ]{〈·, ·〉, proj1, proj2, h}, and E+xor be defined by extending
Exor with the following equations : proj1(〈x, y〉) = x, and proj2(〈x, y〉) = y.
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The symbol 〈·, ·〉models pairs and proj1 and proj2 projections of the first and second
element. The unary symbol h models a cryptographic hash function. Let AUTN =
〈SQNN ⊕AK,MAC〉, then we have proj1(AUTN)⊕AK =E SQNN .
As we build on the AKISS tool [15,8] we suppose in the following that the signa-
ture and equational theory are an extension the theory of exclusive or, i.e., Σ is such
that Σxor ⊆ Σ and E = Exor ∪ {M = N | M,N ∈ T (Σ r Σxor,X )}. and that E
can be oriented into a convergent rewrite system which has the finite variant property.
This allows to model a wide range of cryptographic primitives, including symmetric
and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, hash functions and also zero knowledge
proofs or blind signatures. We refer the reader to [15] for the precise technical defini-
tions, which are not crucial for this paper.
2.2 Process calculus
Syntax Let Ch be a set of public channel names. A protocol is a set of processes and a
process is generated by the following grammar:
P, P ′, P1, P2 ::= 0 null process
in(c, x).P input
out(c, t).P output
[s = t].P test=
[s 6= t].P test6=
where x ∈ X , s, t ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ), and c ∈ Ch.
A receive action in(c, x) acts as a binding construct for the variable x and free and
bound variables of processes are defined as usual. We also assume that each variable is
bound at most once. A process is ground if it does not contain any free variables. For
sake of conciseness, we sometimes omit the null process at the end of a process.
Following [15], we only consider a minimalistic core calculus. Given that we only
consider a bounded number of sessions (i.e., a process calculus without replication) and
that we aim at verifying trace equivalence, parallel composition, denoted P ‖ Q can be
added as syntactic sugar to denote the set of all interleavings at a cost of an exponential
blow-up (see [15]). Similarly, we can encode conditionals: a process
if t1 = t2 then P else Q
can be encoded by the set {[t1 = t2].P, [t1 6= t2].Q}. As usual we omit else Q when
Q = 0 and sometimes write if t1 6= t2 then P else Q for if t1 = t2 then Q else P . This
will ease the specification of protocols and improve readability. A protocol typically
consists of the set of all possible interleavings.
Example 3. As an example consider a simplified version of the AKA protocol, which is
vulnerable to replay attacks, depicted in Figure 1. The network (NS) and mobile station
(MS) share a secret key kIMSI . NS generates a nonce r which it sends to MS together
with f(kIMSI , r) where f models a message authentication code (MAC). MS verifies
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MS
kIMSI
NS
kIMSI
nonce r
XMAC ← f(kIMSI , r)
〈r,XMAC〉
MAC ← f(kIMSI , r)
if MAC 6= XMAC
then RES ← MAC FAIL
else RES ← f2(kIMSI , r)
RES
set sessions keys if RES 6= f2(kIMSI , r)
then RECOVER
else set sessions keys
Fig. 1: A simplified version of the AKA protocol
the MAC: if successful it sends another MAC based on function f2 and generates ses-
sions keys from r and kIMSI ; otherwise, it sends an error message. NS checks whether
the received message is the expected MAC or the error message. In case the MAC is
received it generates the sessions keys; otherwise it starts a recovery protocol.
Using the additional operators introduced above, we can model the protocol as
MS ‖ NS where
NS=̂ out(c, 〈r, f(kIMSI , r)〉).in(c, x).if x 6= f2(kIMSI , r) then out(c,RECOVER)
MS=̂ in(c, y). if y 6= f(kIMSI , r) then out(c,MAC FAIL) else out(c, f2(kIMSI , r))
If we skip the actions [x 6= f2(kIMSI , r)].out(c,RECOVER), the protocol corre-
sponds to a set of 12 processes which include, for instance, the 4 following processes.
out(c, 〈r, f(kIMSI , r)〉).in(c, y).[y 6= f(kIMSI , r)].out(c,MAC FAIL).in(c, x)
out(c, 〈r, f(kIMSI , r)〉).in(c, y).[y = f(kIMSI , r)].out(c, f2(kIMSI , r)).in(c, x)
out(c, 〈r, f(kIMSI , r)〉).in(c, y).in(c, x).[y 6= f(kIMSI , r)].out(c,MAC FAIL)
out(c, 〈r, f(kIMSI , r)〉).in(c, y).in(c, x).[y = f(kIMSI , r)].out(c, f2(kIMSI , r))
Note that since a test is an invisible action, there is no need to consider traces where a
test does not strictly precede its following action. The correctness of this optimization
is proven in [15].
Semantics In order to define the operational semantics of our process calculus we
define the notion of message deduction. Intuitively, message deduction models which
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new messages an intruder can construct from previously learnt messages. The messages
output during a protocol execution are presented by a frame:
ϕ = {w1 7→ t1, . . . ,w` 7→ t`}
A frame is a substitution dom(ϕ) = {w1, . . . ,w`}. An intruder may refer to the ith
term through the parameter wi.
Definition 1. Let ϕ be a frame, t ∈ T (Σ,N ) and R ∈ T (Σ,Npub ∪ dom(ϕ)). We say
that t is deducible from ϕ using R, written ϕ `R t, when Rϕ =E t.
Intuitively, an attacker can deduce new messages by applying function symbols in
Σ to public names (in Npub) and terms he already knows (those in ϕ). The term R is
called a recipe.
A configuration is a pair (P,ϕ) where P is a ground process, and ϕ is a frame. The
operational semantics is defined as a labelled transition relation on configurations `−→
where ` is either an input, an output, or an unobservable action test defined as follows:
RECV (in(c, x).P, ϕ)
in(c,R)−−−−→ (P{x 7→ t}, ϕ) if ϕ `R t
SEND (out(c, t).P, ϕ)
out(c)−−−→ (P,ϕ ∪ {w|ϕ|+1 7→ t})
TEST= ([s = t].P, ϕ) test−−→ (P,ϕ) if s =E t
TEST 6= ([s 6= t].P, ϕ) test−−→ (P,ϕ) if s 6=E t
Intuitively, the labels have the following meaning:
– in(c,R) represents the input of a message sent by the attacker on channel c and the
message is deduced using recipe R;
– out(c) represents the output of a message on channel c (adding the message to the
frame);
– test represents the evaluation of a conditional (in the equational theory).
When ` 6= test we define `=⇒ to be test−−→
∗ `−→ test−−→
∗
and we lift `−→ and `=⇒ to sequences
of actions. Given a protocol P , we write (P, ϕ) `1,...,`n−−−−−→ (P ′, ϕ′) if there exists P ∈ P
such that (P,ϕ)
`1,...,`n−−−−−→ (P ′, ϕ′), and similarly for `=⇒.
2.3 Trace equivalence
The fact that an attacker cannot distinguish two protocols will be modelled through
trace equivalence. We first define the notion of a test which an attacker may apply on a
frame to try to distinguish two processes.
Definition 2. Let ϕ be a frame and R1, R2 be two terms in T (Σ,Npub ∪ dom(ϕ)).
The test R1
?
= R2 holds on frame ϕ, written (R1 = R2)ϕ, if R1ϕ =E R2ϕ.
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Trace equivalence of processes P and Q states that any test that holds on process P
(after some execution) also holds on process Q after the same execution.
Definition 3 ([15]). A protocol P is trace included in a protocol Q, denoted P v Q,
if whenever (P, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (P,ϕ) and (R1 = R2)ϕ, then there exists a configuration
(Q′, ϕ′) such that (Q, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (Q′, ϕ′) and (R1 = R2)ϕ′.
We say that P and Q are equivalent, written P ≈ Q, if P v Q and Q v P .
This notion of equivalence does not coincide with the usual notion of trace equiv-
alence as defined e.g. in [18]. It is actually coarser and is therefore sound for finding
attacks. However, it has been shown that the classical and above defined notions coin-
cide for the class of determinate processes [15].
Definition 4 ([15]). We say that a protocolP is determinate if whenever (P, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒
(P,ϕ), and (P, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (P ′, ϕ′), then for any test R1
?
= R2, we have that:
(R1 = R2)ϕ if, and only if (R1 = R2)ϕ′.
Determinacy of a protocol can be achieved through sufficient syntactic conditions, e.g.
enforcing action-determinism [9]: all executions of an action determinate process en-
sure that we cannot reach a process P where the same action may lead to two dif-
ferent processes, e.g. we forbid the set of processes generated by (out(c, a).P1) ‖
((out(c, b).P2) but allow (out(c1, a).P1) ‖ ((out(c2, b).P2). Action-determinism is au-
tomatically checked by AKISS. Whenever processes are not determinate, the above
equivalence can be used to disprove trace equivalence, i.e., find attacks. The capabil-
ity of AKISS to under approximate trace equivalence consists in finding a one-to-one
mapping between each process of P and Q such that the pair of processes, which are
determinate by construction, are equivalent. Such an approach is still possible with our
procedure. In this paper we develop a procedure which checks trace equivalence on
determinate processes and may be used for finding attacks on general processes.
3 Modelling using Horn clauses
Our decision procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a process in first-order
Horn clauses which has initially been developed in [15] and adapted to support the Xor
operator in [8]. In this section we recall the main definitions and theorems of [8].
3.1 Predicates
We define the set of symbolic runs, denoted u, v, w, . . ., as the set of finite sequences of
symbolic labels:
u, v, w := ε | `, w
with ` ∈ {in(c, t), out(c), test | t ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ), c ∈ Ch}
The empty sequence is denoted by ε. Intuitively, a symbolic run stands for a set of
possible runs of the protocol. We denote u vE v when u is a prefix (modulo E) of v.
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(P0, ϕ0) |= r`1,...,`n if (P0, ϕ0)
L1−−→ (P1, ϕ1) . . .
Ln−−→ (Pn, ϕn)
such that `i =E Liϕi−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(P0, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R, t) if when (P0, ϕ0)
L1−−→ (P1, ϕ1)
L2−−→ . . . Ln−−→ (Pn, ϕn)
such that `i =E Liϕi−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ϕn `R t
(P0, ϕ0) |= i`1,...,`n(R,R′) if there exists t such that (P0, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R, t)
and (P0, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R′, t)
(P0, ϕ0) |= ri`1,...,`n(R,R′) if (P0, ϕ0) |= r`1,...,`n and (P0, ϕ0) |= i`1,...,`n(R,R′)
Fig. 2: Semantics of atomic formulas
We assume a set Y of recipe variables disjoint from X , and we use capital letters
X,Y, Z to range over Y . We assume that such variables may only be substituted by
terms in T (Σ,Npub ∪W ∪ Y).
We consider four kinds of predicates over which we construct the atomic formulas
of our logic. Below, w denotes a symbolic run,R,R′ are terms in T (Σ,Npub∪W∪Y),
and t is a term in T (Σ,N∪X ). Informally, these predicates have the following meaning
(see Figure 2 for the formal semantics).
– rw holds when the run represented by w is executable;
– kw(R, t) holds if whenever the run represented by w is executable, the message t
can be constructed by the intruder using the recipe R;
– iw(R,R′) holds if whenever the run w is executable, R and R′ are recipes for the
same term; and
– riw(R,R′) is a short form for the conjunction of the predicates rw and iw(R,R′).
A (ground) atomic formula is interpreted over a pair consisting of a process P and
a frame ϕ, and we write (P,ϕ) |= f when the atomic formula f holds for (P,ϕ)
or simply P |= f when ϕ is the empty frame. We consider first-order formulas built
over the above atomic formulas and the usual connectives (conjunction, disjunction,
negation, implication, existential and universal quantification). The semantics is defined
as expected, but the domain of quantified variables depends on their type: variables in
X may be mapped to any term in T (Σ,N ), while recipe variables in Y are mapped to
recipes, i.e. terms in T (Σ,Npub ∪W).
3.2 Statements and saturation
We now identify a subset of the formulas, which we call statements. Statements will
take the form of Horn clauses, and we shall be mainly concerned with them.
Definition 5 ([15]). A statement is a Horn clause of the formH ⇐ ku1(X1, t1), . . . , kun(Xn, tn)
where:
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– H ∈ {ru0 , ku0(R, t), iu0(R,R′), riu0(R,R′)};
– u0, u1, . . . , un are symbolic runs such that ui vE u0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
– t, t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X );
– R,R′ ∈ T (Σ,Npub ∪W ∪ Y); and
– X1, . . . , Xn are distinct variables from Y .
Lastly, vars(t) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , tn) when H = ku0(R, t).
In the definition above, we implicitly assume that all variables are universally quan-
tified, i.e. all statements are ground. By abuse of language we sometimes call σ a
grounding substitution for a statement H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn when σ is grounding for each
of the atomic formulas H,B1, . . . , Bn.
In [15], the authors present a saturation-based procedure sat that given a ground
process P produces a fully abstract set of solved statements sat(P ). The procedure
starts by translating P and the equational theory into a finite set of statements. Then
this set is saturated by applying Horn clause resolution rules. Finally, if the procedure
terminates (which is guaranteed for subterm convergent equational theories), the set
of solved statements K produced by the saturation procedure is a sound and complete
abstraction of P : any statement that holds on the protocol P is a logical consequence of
K. The notion of logical consequence is formalised through the (infinite) setHe(K).
Definition 6 ([8]). Given a set K of statements, H(K) is the smallest set of ground
facts that is closed under the rules of Figure 3. We define He(K) to be the smallest set
of ground facts containingH(K) and that is closed under the rules of Figure 4.
CONSEQ EXTEND
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K
σ grounding for f B1σ ∈ H(K), . . . , Bnσ ∈ H(K)
Hσ ∈ H(K)
ku(R, t) ∈ H(K)
kuv(R, t) ∈ H(K)
Fig. 3: Rules ofH(K)
REFL
iw(R,R) ∈ He(K)
CONG
iw(R1, R
′
1), . . . , iw(Rn, R
′
n) ∈ He(K) f ∈ Σ
iw(f(R1, . . . Rn), f(R
′
1, . . . R
′
n)) ∈ He(K)
EXT
iu(R,R
′) ∈ He(K)
iuv(R,R
′) ∈ He(K)
EQ. CONSEQ.
kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) iw(R,R′) ∈ He(K)
kw(R
′, t) ∈ He(K)
Fig. 4: Rules ofHe(K)
Theorem 1 ([8]). Let K = sat(P ) for some ground process P . We have that:
– P |= f for any f ∈ K ∪He(K);
– If (P, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Q,ϕ) then
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1. rL1ϕ,...,Lnϕ ∈E He(K);
2. if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ,...,Lnϕ(R, t) ∈E He(K);
3. if ϕ `R t and ϕ `R′ t, then iL1ϕ,...,Lnϕ(R,R′) ∈E He(K).
4 Algorithm
We first introduce a few notations and preliminary definitions. We start by introducing
the recipe function: its goal is to associate a sequence of labels to a symbolic run and
a positive process (in the labels we replace the input terms of the symbolic run by the
recipes used to deduce them).
Definition 7. Given a positive process P and a symbolic run `1, . . . , `k we define a
function recP (`1 . . . `k) = L1 . . . Lk where
Li =
{
in(c,R) if `i = in(c, t) and k`1...`i−1(R, t) ∈ H(sat(P ) ∪K)
`i otherwise
and K = {kε(Xi, xi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, vars(`1, . . . , `k) = {x1, . . . xn}, X1, . . . Xn ∈
Y are pairwise distinct and fresh}.
Note that several functions may satisfy the specification of this definition. Here we con-
sider any possible implementation of this specification, e.g., the one presented in [15].
The complicated case is when the symbolic label is an input: in that case we need to
retrieve the corresponding recipe in sat(P ). As the symbolic labels may not be closed
we simply enhance sat(P ) with a recipe X for each variable x (the set K).
To check equivalence between processes we rely on the notion of reachable iden-
tity test written RIdL1,...,Lk(R,R
′) where L1, . . . , Lk are (not necessarily ground) la-
bels and R,R′ (not necessarily ground) recipes. For a test t we denote by lbl(t) its
sequence of labels L1, . . . , Lk. For commodity reason, we also define a reachability
test as: RL1,...,Lk=̂RIdL1,...,Lk(0, 0).
Given a ground process P and a test t the predicate VerP (t) checks whether t holds
in P . We define VerP (RIdL1,...,Lk)(R,R
′) to hold when (P, ∅) L1σ,...,Lkσ=======⇒ (P ′, ϕ)
and (Rσ = R′σ)ϕ where σ is a bijection from vars(L1, . . . , Lk, R,R′) to fresh names
{c1, . . . , cn}. Finally the predicate is lifted to protocols and we write VerP(t) for ∃P ∈
P. VerP (t).
We note that when VerP (t) holds and P is positive then VerP (tσ) holds for any σ,
as equality is stable by substitution. However, a disequality may hold when instantiated
by distinct fresh names, while a different instantiation may make the test fail.
Next we define the process rm6=(P ) which simply removes all inequality tests.
Definition 8. Let P be a process such that P = P1.[t1 6= t′1].P2. . . . .[tm 6= t′m].Pm+1
and P1.P2. . . . .Pm+1 is positive. We define the process rm 6=(P )=̂P1. . . . .Pm+1.
Given a process P we define the set of reachable identity tests TestRId(P ).
TestRId(P ) = {RIdL1,...,Lk(R,R′) |
ri`1,...,`k(R,R
′)⇐ ku1(X1, x1), . . . , kun(Xn, xn) ∈ sat(rm 6=(P )),
L1, . . . , Lk = (recP (`1, . . . , `k))σ where σ = {Xj 7→ Xmin{i|xi=xj} | 1 ≤ j ≤ k},
VerP (RIdL1,...,Lk(R,R
′))}
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We also define reachability tests TestR(P ) for a process P :
TestR(P ) = {t | t ∈ TestRId(P ), ∃L1, . . . , Lk, t = RL1,...,Lk}
We note that we can only apply the sat function to positive processes. If P was
already a positive process VerP (t) would hold for each of the constructed tests because
of the soundness of sat. However, in general, Verrm6=(P )(t) may hold while VerP (t)
does not hold, which is why we explicitly test the validity of t in P .
In [15] it is shown that given a positive ground process P and a positive determinate
protocol Q, we have that
P vt Q iff ∀t ∈ TestRId(P ). VerQ(t)
which can be used to check trace inclusion between protocols (as P vt Q iff ∀P ∈
P.P vt Q) and trace equivalence (as P ≈t Q iff P vt Q and Q vt P). This result
does however not hold for processes with disequality tests.
Example 4. Let P = in(c, x).out(c, a) and Q = in(c, x).[x 6= a].out(c, a). We have
that P 6≈t Q but all tests that hold on P also hold on Q (and vice-versa). In particular
Rin(c,X).out(c) ∈ TestR(P ) holds in Q, as (Q, ∅)
in(c,c1).out(c)
========⇒ (0, ϕ) for a fresh name
c1.
Whenever a test holds on rm 6=(P ) but not on P , it must be that a disequality test
in P did not hold. We therefore compute the complement of a process, which is the
set of positive processes which transforms a disequality into an equality and removes
remaining disequalities.
Definition 9. Let P be a process such that
P = P1.[t1 6= t′1].P2. . . . .[tm 6= t′m].Pm+1
and P1.P2. . . . .Pm+1 is positive. We define the complement of P , comp(P ) to be the
set
{P1.P2. . . . .Pi−1.[ti = t′i].Pi. . . . .Pm.Pm+1|1 ≤ i ≤ m}
We easily see that we have the following property.
Lemma 1. Let P be a process and t a test. We have that
Verrm 6=(P )(t) iff either VerP (t) or Vercomp(P )(t)
Lastly, before explaining our algorithm we need to introduce the shrink operator on
processes which is used in conjunction with the Inst operators on sequences of labels.
Given a process P and a sequence of labels lbl we define a process that only executes
instances of lbl (up to test actions which are ignored). In the following we suppose that
variables in Y,X and names in N are totally ordered by an order <Y , <X resp. <N .
Definition 10. Let P be a process, lbl a sequence of labels, σ an increasing bijection
from vars(lbl) ∩ Y to a set of fresh and pairwise distinct term variable in X , θ an
increasing bijection from vars(lbl) ∩ Y to a set of fresh and pairwise distinct names in
N , such that (P, ∅) L1θ,...,Lnθ=======⇒ (P ′, ϕ). Let lbl0 be the subsequence of lbl obtained by
removing all test labels. We define shrinklbl(P ) as shr∅lbl0(P ) where
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– shrvlbl([s ∼ t].P ) = [s ∼ t].shr
v
lbl(P ) for ∼∈ {=, 6=}
– shrvout(c)·lbl(out(c, t).P ) = out(c, t).shr
v
lbl(P ),
– shrvin(c,R)·lbl(in(c, x).P )
= in(cs, X1σ). . . . .in(cs, Xnσ).in(c, x).[x = Rϕθ−1σ].shr
vars(R)∪v
lblσ (P )
where vars(R) ∩ Y \ v = {X1, . . . , Xn} and Xi < Xi+1,
– 0 otherwise
and cs is a dedicated channel not appearing in P .
Note that the function shrink depends on the chosen bijection but this only changes
the process up to alpha renaming. Note that we cannot force an execution to contain
an instance of a particular recipe R. The inserted test [x = Rϕσ] only ensures that
the input of x is produced by some recipe R′ such that (Rσ = R′)ϕ . We therefore
additionally add inputs in(cs, xi) which will allow us to retrieve instance Rθ of R that
yields the same protocol message as R.
Definition 11. Let lbl, lbl′ be sequences of labels. If
in(lbl) = in(cs, R11) . . . in(cs, R
n1
1 ).in(c1, R1). . . . .in(cs, R
k
1) . . . in(cs, R
nk
k ).in(ck, Rk);
in(lbl′) = in(c1, R′1). . . . .in(ck, R
′
k) and vars(R
′
i) \
⋃
j<i
vars(R′j) = {X1i , . . . , X
ni
i }
withXji < X
j+1
i then we define Inst(lbl, lbl
′) = {Xji 7→ R
j
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni}.
Otherwise Inst(lbl, lbl′) = ⊥.
Example 5. Let P = in(c, x).out(c, 0) be a process and lbl = in(c, 〈Y, 0〉), out(c)
a sequence of labels. Consider two bijections σ = {Y 7→ y} and θ = {Y 7→ a}.
The process shrinklbl(P ) = in(cs, y).in(c, x).[x = 〈y, 0〉].out(c, 0) allows to iden-
tify the recipes Y such that (P,ϕ) lblσ−−→ (P ′, ϕ′). Indeed, assume TestR(shrinklbl(P ))
contains r = Rin(cs,h(0)).in(c,〈h(0),0〉.out(c), then rτ = Rin(c,〈h(0),0〉.out(c) where τ =
Inst(lbl, lbl(r)) is such that Verrτ (P ) and lbl(rτ) is an instance of l.
The algorithm Equiv for verifying trace equivalence on determinate processes is
detailed in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2. Let P and Q be two determinate protocols. Then we have that
P ≈t Q iff Equiv(P ≈tQ)
The algorithm proceeds as follows. For each P ∈ P we check whether all traces of
P are included in Q. For this we compute the set RidP of reachable identity tests that
hold in P and that need to be checked on Q. We next pick a test rid from the set (and
remove it from the set, denoted rid := pop(RidP )) and check whether this test holds
for some process Q inQ. If this is not the case we violate trace equivalence. Otherwise
we need to perform additional checks: indeed even if the test rid holds, an instance of
rid might not hold on Q but still hold in P . Consider the following simple example:
P = in(c, x).out(c, a) Q1 = in(c, x).[x 6= a].out(c, a)
Q = {Q1, Q2} Q2 = in(c, x).[x = a].out(c, a)
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Algorithm 1: Decision procedure for P ≈t Q
Function Check(P,Q)
Input: Process P , protocolQ
Output: Boolean
RidP := Test
RId(P );
while RidP 6= ∅ do
rid := pop(RidP );
SQ := {Q ∈ Q | VerQ(rid)};
if SQ = ∅ then return false;
Q := pop(SQ);
foreach Q ∈ comp(shrinklbl(rid)(Q)) do
RQ := {r ∈ Test
R(Q) | |lbl(r)| = |Q|};
foreach r ∈ RQ do
σ := Inst(lbl(r), lbl(rid));
if VerP (Rlbl(rid)σ) then RidP := RidP ∪ {ridσ};
return true
Function Equiv(P,Q)
Input: Protocols P,Q
Output: Boolean
return
∧
P∈P Check(P,Q) ∧
∧
Q∈Q Check(Q,P)
Note that P ≈t Q. Let rid = RIdin(c,X).out(c)(a, a). This test holds in Q1. However,
the more instantiated test RIdin(c,a).out(c)(a, a) would not hold. (Note that the test may
actually only fail because reachability is violated.) We therefore need to identify the
instances of rid Q1 that do not hold on Q1. The process shrinkQ(lbl(rid)) defines
the process that only verifies instances of rid. Computing its complement defines the
processes that verify the instances of rid that are not verified by Q: in our example
we would identify the test r = Rin(c,a).out(c), as computing the complement transforms
[x 6= a] into [x = a]. Finally, we check whether r is verified by P . If this is the
case, we add the more instantiated test RIdin(c,a).out(c)(a, a) to the set RidP of tests to
be checked. We note that the fact that Q1 does not verify r, but P does is not yet a
violation of trace equivalence: another trace in Q may well verify the instantiated test.
In our example, indeed the process Q2 verifies RIdin(c,a).out(c)(a, a).
Theorem 2 above ensures partial correctness, i.e., soundness and completeness. We
now state that total correctness only depends on the termination of sat.
Theorem 3. If procedure sat terminates then procedure Equiv terminates.
As it was shown in [15], termination of sat is ensured for a wide class of subterm
convergent equational theories. While sat may not terminate in general on other theories
such as xor, or blind signatures, the tool does terminate in practice on a wide range of
examples [15,8] (and Theorem 2 ensures the correctness of the result).
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5 Implementation and case studies
5.1 The AKISS tool
In addition to parallel composition P ‖ Q and conditionals AKISS also supports non-
deterministic choice P ++Q, sequences P ::Q and phases P >>Q, which are conve-
nient for defining complex scenarios under which we analyse protocols. A sequence
P ::Q contains all sequences of a trace of P followed by a trace of Q while the set
of traces for a phase P >>Q contains all traces made of the beginning of a trace of P
followed by a full trace of Q.
We model unlinkability for two sessions in each of the protocols below as follows:
P 1A >>P
2
A ≈ P 1A >>P 2B
The attacker first interacts with a first session of protocol P executed by A, denoted
P 1A. Then, in a new phase he interacts with a second session of the protocol, which
is either executed by A (process P 2A) or by B (process P
2
A). The protocol P satisfies
unlinkability if the two scenarios cannot be distinguished. Note that the use of the phase
operator is preferable to the sequential composition, as an attacker may not be able to
finish the first session completely before starting the second session.
The implementation of the tool and the files corresponding to our case studies are
freely available at https://github.com/akiss/.
5.2 The AKA protocol
Unlike the simplified version of AKA described in Figure 1, the actual AKA protocol
[25] provides a mechanism against replay attacks. In addition to the mac value, both
the network and the mobile station store a counter SQN used as a timestamps: each
time the network station starts a session with a same mobile station, it sends in addition
to the random value and the mac an obfuscated message SQN ⊕ kIMSI containing
the incremented value of the counter. The mobile stores the maximum value which has
been received. If the received value is not strictly greater than this maximum, the mobile
sends a synchronization error message. Otherwise it updates the stored value.
Unlinkability is modelled as explained above: in a first session a mobile station A
interacts with the network station and in a second session either mobile A or mobile
B interact with the network station. The AKISS tool does not allow for comparison of
integer. Instead we just check that the sent value was not the same as a previous one.
Therefore during the first phase, since there was no SQN value sent to the mobile there
is no need to perform a check while in the second session of the mobile A (in the first
scenario) we check that the new SQN value is distinct from the first time.
Using the AKISS tool we find the (previously known) attack consisting of observing
the first phase and sending the network station’s message of the first phase in the second
one: if the second phase is with the same mobile station then it sends a synchronization
error message while if its another mobile station it sends a mac error message. Running
our tool on a 30 core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2687W v3 @ 3.10GHz, the attack is
found in 3 minutes.
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5.3 Unlinkability on some other protocols
We also analysed the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol [26], the Private Authenti-
cation Protocol (PAP) [2] and two RFID protocols [33]: LAK and SLK.
All these protocols use else branches to send error messages except for the LAK
RFID protocol. However, even though this protocol does not contain branches, the sce-
narios required for expressing unlinkability does requires the use of an else branch for
the key update. Indeed, when a session succeeds, the key is updated for the next ses-
sion, while the previous key is reused in case of failure. This results into an if then else
structure. Finally, for the SLK and LAK protocols where both the tag and the reader
update their data, the scenarios to consider for two sessions are the following.
Psame = ((TagAa ‖ Readera)>> (TagA ‖ Reader))
++ ((TagA ‖ (Readera >> 0)):: (TagAu ‖ Reader))
++ (((TagAa >> 0) ‖ Reader):: (TagA ‖ Readeru))
++ ((TagA ‖ Reader):: (TtagAu ‖ Readeru))
The roles with index u model the role with a preliminary update if test then R else R′
where R′ is R with updated values. As the update test is not defined before all inputs
have been received, we introduce Ra for each role R to be the process where the last
input and the update test are missing (and moreover the construct R>> 0 allows the
adversary to stop that instance of the role even earlier): in this case, the update will not
happen anyway. Therefore, our scenario has four cases depending on whether the tag,
the reader, both or none have reached the update test or not. The scenario where the
instances of the tags corresponds to different tag is similar.
Pdiff = ((TagA ‖ Readera)>> (TagB ‖ Reader))
++ (((TagA >> 0) ‖ Reader):: (TagB ‖ Readeru))
Note that as we consider a different tag in the second session we do not need to worry
whether TagA was updated or not.
The AKISS tool establishes the equivalence for PAP in 4s. It finds known attacks
on BAC in 1m30, on SLK in 6s and in 7h for LAK. The much longer time for LAK is
due to the particular use of xor which leads to complex unifiers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we present an extension of AKISS which allows automated verification
of protocols with else branches. An appealing aspect of our approach is that we do
not modify the saturation procedure underlying the AKISS tool. As a result we obtain
a new decidability result for the class of subterm convergent equational theories and
an effective automated analysis tool. We have been able to analyse several protocols
including the AKA protocol, and RFID protocols which require both support for xor
and else branches.
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